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Abstract: Regulators and the public are concerned about accounting firms lobbying politicians 
on behalf of their own audit clients because it could impair auditor independence. In this study, 
we examine whether these lobbying activities by accounting firms are associated with their 
clients’ audit quality. Since required disclosures of lobbying activities are limited, we construct a 
novel proxy to capture auditor lobbying on behalf of audit clients. Using this proxy, we find that 
perceived audit quality is negatively related to lobbying. However, we fail to find that actual 
audit quality is lower for these clients. Our findings suggest that investors perceive auditors’ 
lobbying for clients’ political interests as harmful to audit quality but that these concerns do not 
appear to materialize in the outcome of the audit process. This evidence suggests that reputation 
concerns and litigation risk may provide enough discipline for auditors to maintain independence. 
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1. Introduction 
Public accounting firms comprise one of the largest groups that lobby regulators at 
various levels of government. The lobbying arms of PricewaterhouseCoopers and Ernst 
&Young, for example, consistently rank among the top 20 lobbying firms in the country, based 
on lobbying revenue.1 Accounting firms lobby on their own behalf and on the behalf of their 
clients – some of whom are also their audit clients. Their lobbying for audit clients is 
controversial, and politicians, regulators, and the public have repeatedly expressed concerns 
about it.  
Recently, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigated Ernst & Young, 
one of the “Big Four” accounting firms, for the lobbying service it provided for two of its audit 
clients, which potentially violated the auditor’s rule of independence. Ernest & Young eventually 
paid a fine of $4 million to the SEC to settle accusations, as reported by The New York Times 
(Norris, 2014). Scott W. Friestad, the associate director in the SEC’s division of enforcement, is 
quoted saying “Auditor independence is critical to the integrity of the financial reporting process. 
When an auditor acts as an advocate for its audit client, that independence is compromised. Ernst 
& Young engaged in lobbying activities that constituted improper advocacy and clearly violated 
the rules.”  
The political debate surrounding accounting firms providing nonaudit services to audit 
clients is longstanding. Some argue that nonaudit servicescould compromise auditors’ 
independence because they create incentives for the auditors to be less stringent with their 
clients. In fact, many blame nonaudit services for the series of accounting scandals involving 
firms such as Enron and Worldcom around 2000. In response to this crisis, the SEC initiated a 
series of discussions scrutinizing certain auditor-provided nonaudit services, and eventually 
                                                     
1Reported by the Center for Responsive Politics.  
2 
 
decided to ban any nonaudit services that could potentially impair auditor independence in 2002. 
Lobbying on behalf of clients was included in the discussions but ultimately escaped scrutiny 
(Squires, 2003).  
In fact, until the recent SEC investigation of Ernst & Young, there was no clear guidance 
whether lobbying for audit clients violates the principle of auditor independence.2 With some 
nonaudit services, such as consulting, the revenue generated from the business is often a 
significant portion of an auditor’s overall revenue. This could give the auditor incentives to 
acquiesce to client demands and compromise audit quality in order to retain the lucrative 
consulting contract. However, an auditor’s revenue from lobbying services is typically quite 
small, which leads to the natural question  why regulators are even concerned with such practice. 
In the case against Ernst & Young, the SEC based their disapproval of auditor-provided lobbying 
services on the ground of “inappropriate advocacy” of clients. Specifically, auditor lobbying for 
audit clients could pose an “advocacy threat” to auditor independence which could lead to lower 
audit quality.  
Advocacy threat is one of the five threats to independence enumerated by the Conceptual 
Framework for the American Institute of CPAs (AICPA) Independence Standards.3 The AICPA 
conceptual framework defines an advocacy threat as “actions that promote an attest client’s 
interest or position.”4 Advocacy threats impair auditor independence when auditors promote a 
                                                     
2Although auditor-provided lobbying services were not legally forbidden at the time, several politicians and 
regulators have expressed concerns about the issue to the media prior to the SEC’s final decision. U.S. Sen. Carl 
Levin called for regulatory attention on auditors lobbying in March 2012: “The [Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board] should look into whether lobbying by an accounting firm is the type of service that is or should be 
banned under the auditor independence law.” Douglas Carmichael, the former chief auditor for the PCAOB, has 
been quoted as saying that “lobbying members of Congress on behalf of audit clients would make the auditor an 
advocate for the client” (Aubin et al., 2012). On May 3, 2012, James Kroeker, then chief accountant for the SEC, 
said that auditors lobbying for clients may put themselves in the position of being the clients’ advocates and that 
investors would not trust the independence of these auditors (Kroecker, 2012). 
3The other four threats are self-interest, self-review, familiarity, and intimidation. 
4For example, if an auditor advocates for a client to receive a loan based on the financial statements prepared and 
reviewed by the auditor, this could impair auditor independence. The auditor may be more inclined to represent 
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position to the point that their advocacy compromises their objectivity. Lobbying legislators and 
standard setters on behalf of clients means representing and advocating the clients’ political 
interests, which could lead to an advocacy threat (Shaub, 2005). The auditor may lose objectivity 
and professional skepticism during the financial reporting process. And even if auditors do not 
lose their skepticism, others may perceive them as losing it which could affect actual or 
perceived audit quality.  
On the other hand, auditors have market-based incentives to maintain their independence, 
protect their reputation, and reduce their litigation risk (DeAngelo 1981; Watts and Zimmerman 
1983). The incentive to protect their reputation and avoid litigation may be strong enough to 
ensure auditors maintain their independence and provide high audit quality. As such, whether 
auditor lobbying for clients leads to lower audit quality remains an open empirical question.  
Our study intends to empirically examine whether auditor-provided lobbying services 
impair audit quality. To our knowledge, no academic study has examined this issue 
systematically. The main reason for the lack of empirical evidence is that the officially disclosed 
auditor-provided lobbying services for audit clients are very limited, and does not fully represent 
the regulators’ concern about the auditors’ inappropriate advocacy of their clients. While 
accounting firms have strong incentives to lobby for their clients,5 the majority of auditor 
lobbying for their clients is implicit (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). That is, an accounting firm 
does not have to sign an explicit contract to lobby on behalf of their client and does not have to 
register its lobbying activities with regulators, but its political activities still promote its clients’ 
interests.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
transactions that lead to a greater likelihood of their client receiving the loan. Other examples of advocacy threat 
include the auditor promoting the client’s securities as part of an initial public offering or representing a client in 
court (Delaney and Whittington, 2011). 
5 Watts and Zimmerman (1982) propose that accounting firms’ wealth is a function of their clients’ wealth. 
Therefore accounting firms may advocate for their clients’ interests as they could benefit indirectly if their clients 
thrive. 
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Following the argument provided by prior literature (Snyder, 1992; Ansolabehere et al., 
2002; Ramanna, 2008; etc.), we construct a novel proxy for auditor lobbying on behalf of audit 
clients by analyzing the common pattern in their political action committee (PAC) 
contributions.6 This proxy attempts to capture both officially disclosed and undisclosed lobbying 
activities. Corporate PACs strategically select politicians who hold key positions overseeing 
policies concerning these companies, and donate to these politicians to show their support and 
foster opportunities of further contacts. PACs are funded by company executives, employees, and 
shareholders of the firm. For example, Big 4 PAC contributions are funded almost exclusively by 
their own partners from local offices. Therefore, when an auditor’s PAC and its client’s PAC 
choose to make political contributions to the same politicians, we conjecture that they share 
similar political goals and preferences and that the auditor is more likely to lobby for positions 
favored by the client. As such, we measure auditor lobbying for a client as the percentage of 
overlap of the politicians that the auditor and the client donate to through PAC contributions. We 
also perform several tests to confirm the validity of this measure. 
 Next, we examine the relation between our measure of auditor lobbying and several 
commonly-used proxies of audit quality in accounting literature. We find that perceived audit 
quality (measured using earnings response coefficients) is negatively related to lobbying. 
However, we fail to find a negative association between actual audit quality (measured as the 
propensity to restate earnings, propensity to issue a going-concern opinion, and discretionary 
accruals) and our proxy for lobbying. Our evidence suggests that stock market participants 
                                                     
6 American corporations are prohibited from directly giving donations to politicians by the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. 
However, they are allowed to establish PACs, which are separate entities dedicated to promote the corporation’s 
political interests. A corporate PAC solicits contributions from the affiliated company’s executives, employees and 
shareholders, etc., and makes donations to selected politicians. Although companies are forbidden from directly 
contributing to their own PACs, they provide the PACs with administrative and executive support. Typically, 
corporate executives also serve as the chairpersons and treasurers of these PACs and are directly involved in 
deciding which politicians to contribute to. 
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perceive auditors’ lobbying for clients’ political interests as harmful to audit quality but that 
these concerns may not materialize in the outcome of the audit process.7  
To our knowledge, our study is the first to examine the impact of auditor-provided 
lobbying services. Puro (1984) examines accounting firms lobbying behavior at the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) level. She scrutinizes comment letters written to the FASB 
to identify auditing firms’ lobbying positions and relates it to the auditors’ underlying incentives. 
Several other studies examine corporations lobbying the FASB for themselves on various 
accounting regulations such as accounting for employers’ pensions (Francis, 1987) or accounting 
for oil and gas production (Deakin, 1989). Other studies examine firms lobbying the SEC for 
themselves on accounting issues such as executive compensation disclosure rules (Lo, 2003) and 
the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley (Hochberg et al., 2009). Ramanna (2008) examines corporations’ 
lobbying on fair-value accounting issues, specifically through PAC contributions to 
congressional members. While these studies examine how firms (clients and auditors) lobby on 
their own behalf, our paper is the first to examine the audit quality implications of accounting 
firms lobbying on behalf of their audit clients. Our setting differs distinctively from these studies. 
Further, the mechanism that leads to potential impairment of audit quality in auditor-
provided lobbying services is distinctly different from other nonaudit services such as consulting. 
Prior work that examines auditor-provided nonaudit services focuses on the auditors’ incentive to 
obtain more lucrative consulting business at the price of possibly compromised audit quality. In 
contrast, we examine whether auditors’ lobbying impairs auditor independence due to 
                                                     
7 This result is largely consistent with the literature on whether auditor-provided nonaudit services impair auditor 
independence. Specifically, while Francis and Ke (2002) find a negative relation between nonaudit services and 
perceived audit quality, many studies fail to find an association between nonaudit services and actual audit quality 
(DeFond et al. 2002; Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Chung and Kallapur 2003; Larcker and Richardson 2004; Reynolds et al. 
2004) while others find a negative association (Frankel et al. 2002; Markelevich and Rosner 2012; Blay and Geiger 
2012). 
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inappropriate advocacy of their clients. It is the advocacy threat, not the economic incentive that 
could affect audit quality in our setting.  
Our findings may provide some insight into the continuing debate on the regulation of 
auditor-provided nonaudit services. While the stock market reacts negatively to the perceived 
impairment of auditor independence, the actual audit quality may not be affected since the 
auditors’ reputation concern and litigation risk may provide enough discipline to the profession. 
Thus, the regulation imposed on the auditor-provided lobbying service may serve more political, 
rather than economic purposes. 
2. Background and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 BACKGROUND  
The right to petition and lobby the government regarding legislation of interest is one of 
the basic rights of individuals and organizations in the U.S. and is protected under the 
Constitution. The accounting industry, including public accounting firms and industry 
associations, is a powerful political interest group. It has a long history of engagement with 
politicians and regulators and political and regulatory outcomes (Thornburg and Roberts, 2008). 
According to the Center for Responsive Politics, the accounting industry, including the Big 4 
auditors, engaged 160 lobbyists and spent $81 million on campaign contributions and $122 
million on lobbying during the years 1998-2008, making it one of the most politically active 
business groups. During the same period, the AICPA, the primary industry association for the 
accounting industry, spent $4.56 million lobbying the federal government on accounting, 
banking, and tax issues. Immediately following the AICPA in the amount of lobbying spending 
are PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst &Young, KPMG, and Deloitte. 
The disclosure and regulation related to corporate political activities is complex. Figure 1 
summarizes the channels and levels of political activities that accounting firms can engage in. An 
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accounting firm can use two major channels to influence politicians and regulators. The first 
channel is to directly lobby legislators and members of regulatory agencies at the federal or local 
level. Lobbying usually involves one-to-one interactions between the lobbyist and the person of 
interest (or their staff members). The lobbyist communicates knowledge and provides 
information about a particular political issue. The second channel is to make political 
contributions, via PACs, to support a politician’s election campaign. Generally, firms make 
political contributions not to sway the politicians but rather to signal support and create an entry 
ticket for subsequent contact and dialogue (Milyo et al., 2000). These political activities can be 
conducted at the federal and local level, depending on where the politician of interest holds a 
position. Consistent with this, Ansolabehere et al. (2002) find a strong association between these 
PAC contributions and lobbying expenditures; they document that groups with a lobbyist and a 
PAC account for 70% of all interest group expenditures and 86% of all PAC contributions.  
At the federal level, both lobbying and PAC contributions are well regulated and 
disclosed. As required by the Lobbying Disclosure Act, the accounting firms must file regular 
reports with the Senate disclosing their lobbying activities, including the issues lobbied, the 
federal agencies contacted, the lobbyists employed, and the amount of expenses incurred. They 
are also required to report PAC-related information with the Federal Election Commission, 
including donors and recipients of the PAC funds. At the state/municipal level, the regulation 
and disclosure largely depends on local laws. Industry-level lobbying activities are not required 
to be disclosed. Although comment letters to the FASB are publicly available, whether an 
accounting firm writes a letter to promote a specific client’s interest can only be inferred. Puro 
(1984) scrutinizes comment letters to the FASB and finds evidence consistent with accounting 
firms lobbying for their clients at the FASB level.  
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More importantly, any of these political activities engaged in by accounting firms could 
be used to implicitly lobby for audit clients since accounting firms also represent and advise 
audit clients on political and regulatory issues. An auditor can emphasize issues that matter to its 
clients even when not officially representing those clients as a contracted lobbyist.  
2.2 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
The AICPA conceptual framework specifies that an advocacy threat exists when an audit 
firm takes “actions that promote an attest client’s interest or position.” Regulators are concerned 
about auditor lobbying for clients because it could pose an advocacy threat to auditor 
independence, which may hurt audit quality. For example, the congressional report on SOX 
recommends that auditors limit their services for audit clients to performing audits and closely 
related services that do not put the auditor in an advocacy position, presumably because 
regulators worry that lobbying could lead to lower audit quality. The SEC also states that 
auditors should not be placed in a position of advocacy for their audit clients, to maintain auditor 
independence (SEC Rule 2-01 of Regulation S-X).  
However, the potential reputational damage and litigation risk may provide enough 
discipline for auditors so that the advocacy threat to their independence never materializes 
(DeAngelo 1981; Watts and Zimmerman 1983). Therefore it is an empirical question whether 
auditor lobbying for clients impairs auditor independence and leads to lower audit quality. We 
examine the association between auditor lobbying on behalf of their audit clients and perceived 
and actual audit quality.  
Advocacy threats could impair perceived auditor independence when auditors promote a 
position that benefits their audit clients. The value of an audit critically depends on the market’s 
perception of audit quality (Dopuch et al., 2003; Shockley, 1981). A perception that auditors’ 
work is less independent will erode investors’ confidence in the quality of reported accounting 
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information (Ryan et al., 2001; Elliott and Jacobson, 1998).8 Auditors who lobby on behalf of 
their clients could, in fact, maintain independence and still face a market perception of impaired 
independence due to the advocacy threat. The SEC views advocacy as a potential threat to 
perceived auditor independence stating, “If investors were to view the auditor as an advocate for 
the corporate client, the value of the audit function itself might well be lost” (SEC, 2001).  
Information about companies’ lobbying or political contributions that is required to be 
disclosed is publicly available through official websites hosted by the Senate or Federal Election 
Commission. Watchdog organizations such as the Center for Responsive Politics also publish 
and analyze data on corporate political activities. This information can be disseminated in 
financial markets quickly and in a cost efficient manner. In fact, investors have long considered 
companies’ political activities when making investment decisions.9 As such, when investors 
observe an auditor lobbying on behalf of a client, they might question the auditor’s objectivity 
and perceive the auditor as providing lower audit quality. Given the concerns raised by the SEC 
and the public on auditor lobbying for their clients, we examine perceived audit quality. This 
leads to our first hypothesis: 
H1: The client firms’ perceived audit quality is lower when their auditors lobby 
regulators on their behalf. 
 
Lobbying for clients could be associated with lower actual audit quality if auditors are 
more likely to acquiesce to client demands when they also lobby for the client. Prior literature 
provides evidence that firms use accounting flexibility to help achieve political goals (Kothari et 
                                                     
8Former SEC chief accountant Lynn Turner emphasizes the importance of perceived auditor independence saying it 
“not only matters, [but] it is the oxygen that keeps our profession alive.” He further states that “[p]ublic faith in the 
reliability of a corporation's financial statements depends on the public perception of the outside auditor as an 
independent professional” (Turner, 2000). 
9 Hedge fund managers in Wall Street trade on information about firms’ political activities (Gao and Huang, 2011; 
Mullins and Scannell, 2006). The Government Accountability Office’s recent report on “political intelligence” 
documents a robust market for political information based on its research and 34 interviews with people involved 
with supplying, regulating, or using political intelligence (GAO, 2013). 
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al., 2010; Skinner, 2008; Wong, 1988). Jones (1991), for example, shows firms use earnings 
management to decrease reported income during import relief investigations. Ramanna and 
Roychowdhury (2010) likewise show firms use accounting discretion to support the politicians 
they are connected to by employing income-decreasing earnings management to “duck down” 
when their politicians face re-election. On the other hand, reputation concerns and litigation risk 
provide incentives for auditors to maintain independence and provide high audit quality (Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1983), even when lobbying for their audit client. This leads to our second 
hypothesis:  
H2: The client firms’ actual audit quality is lower when their auditors lobby regulators 
on their behalf. 
 
3. Sample Selection and Proxy for Lobbying  
3.1. DATA 
We obtain lobbying and PAC contribution data from the Center for Responsive Politics 
(CRP), which began collecting information in 1998. The CRP compiles PAC contribution 
information by election cycles from the Federal Election Commission’s (FEC) Campaign 
Finance Reports and Data. All PACs are registered with the FEC and required to file reports 
disclosing their activities, including the donors and recipients of their funds. Corporate PACs are 
allowed to solicit up to $5,000 from a donor of the restricted class, such as executives and 
employees, and contribute up to $5,000 to a federal election candidate per election cycle. We 
collect the names of politicians who received contributions from our sample firms’ PACs, as 
well as the amounts of the contributions. The disclosed lobbying data is collected through the 
lobbying reports compiled by CRP based on the lobbyists’ semi-annually filed reports. We 
obtain financial information from Compustat and the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP). Audit information and restatements are obtained from Audit Analytics. Accounting and 
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Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) are obtained from the Center for Financial Reporting 
and Management.  
Our sample is constructed from the Compustat database from years 1998 to 2008. We 
exclude firms without PAC contributions during our sample period to control for the decision to 
contribute to a PAC. We exclude financial and utility firms (SIC 6000-7000 and 4400-5000) 
because they operate in highly regulated industries with accounting rules that differ from those in 
other industries. We exclude firms without the data necessary to calculate the control variables. 
Thus the sample used to examine actual audit quality consists of 4,868 firm-years (523 firms) 
between 1998 and 2008.  
In addition to the sample selection procedure described above, for the perceived audit 
quality sample, we apply the sample selection procedure used by Ghosh and Moon (2005). 
Specifically, (1) we delete the top and bottom percentile of observations for the level of earnings 
(E), changes in earnings (ΔE), annual earnings per share, and the absolute change in annual 
earnings per share. (2) We remove observations with an absolute value of CAR greater than 
100%. And (3) we winsorize continuous control variables at the top and bottom percentiles. 
These criteria result in a sample of 460 firms (3,557 firm-year observations) for the sample used 
to examine perceived audit quality.10  
3.2. CONSTRUCTION OF AUDITOR LOBBYING MEASURE  
There is a longstanding practice of audit clients conveying their political preferences to 
their audit partners. As early as 1969, the Financial Executives Institute encouraged members “to 
contact your outside auditors and request a meeting with the senior partners to discuss your 
views on the proposed [APB] opinion, and also strongly recommends that you seek to determine 
                                                     
10 Our actual audit quality results (i.e. restatements, going-concern opinions, discretionary accruals) are robust to 
conducting the analysis on the smaller perceived audit quality sample. 
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the position your audit firm is taking on this issue.”11 Therefore it seems clients make 
recommendations to local partners in hopes that the agenda will “trickle up” to the accounting 
firm and its overall agenda. 
We construct our proxy to capture auditor lobbying on behalf of a client by analyzing 
their PAC contributions. Although there are other channels firms could use to influence 
regulators, PAC contributions are the only channel that can link a specific corporation to a 
specific regulator (Snyder, 1992) and are typically followed up by direct lobbying money 
(Ansolabehere et al., 2002;). Corporate PACs are established with the sole purpose to fulfill the 
firms’ political goals. They are funded by the firms’ employees and shareholders, and represent 
these stakeholders’ political interests. The PACs of the Big 4 accounting firms, without many 
exceptions, are financed by audit partners from local offices and follow an agenda consistent 
with the interest of these partners and their key clients. 
As discussed earlier, corporate PACs strategically select the recipients of their political 
contributions. The selected regulators are typically involved with legislation that is most 
important to these companies. Therefore, when an auditor’s PAC and its client’s PAC choose to 
make political contributions to the same politicians, we believe that they are more likely to share 
similar political goals and preferences and that the auditor is more likely to lobby for positions 
favored by the client. Given any auditor-client pair, a highly similar list of politicians donated to 
                                                     
11A more recent example is the intense pressure clients put on their auditors related to accounting for employee 
stock options in the early 1990s. The largest national audit firms initially favored expensing employee stock options 
but reversed their opinions following intense client pressure. Walter Schuetze, chief accountant of the SEC at the 
time, raised the following concern: “If public companies are pressuring their outside auditors and the accounting 
standards executive committee (AcSEC) of the American Institute of CPAs to take particular positions on financial 
accounting and reporting issues and outside auditors are subordinating their views to those of their clients, can the 
outside auditor community continue to claim to be independent?” (Schuetze, 1994). When it was clear the FASB 
was going to proceed with a standard requiring expensing, companies and auditors appealed to members of 
Congress. The Senate passed a resolution urging FASB not to move ahead with its standard. Sen. Joe Lieberman, a 
Connecticut independent, went so far as to introduce a bill that effectively would have led to the FASB’s demise 
(Zeff, 2005). The FASB ultimately issued a standard that required footnote disclosure (rather than recognition) of 
the expense associated with stock options. 
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indicates high congruence in the two firms’ political pursuits. As such, we measure auditor 
lobbying for a client as the percentage of overlap of the politicians that the auditor and the client 
donate to through PAC contributions. 
One natural question that arises here is whether the auditors and clients give PAC 
contributions to the same set of politicians but lobby for opposite views on the same issues. 
Milyo et al. (2000) show that PAC contributions are typically given as “entrance fees” that help 
gain access to a politician, instead of a bribery to buy the politician’s vote. They also show a 
positive correlation between the politicians’ voting outcome and the interest of their PAC 
contributors, suggesting firms give PAC contributions to politicians that already share the same 
views. Evidence from Ansolabehere et al. (2002) is also consistent with this theory. 
One advantage of our proxy is that it captures both disclosed and undisclosed lobbying 
activities on behalf of clients. As discussed earlier, auditors can lobby on behalf of their clients 
(i.e., promote their clients’ political interests) in many different ways. They do not have to lobby 
for their clients explicitly as their lobbyists. They can also work through informal channels that 
do not need to be officially disclosed. Since disclosed lobbying is only the tip of the iceberg of 
all potential lobbying activities, capturing unobservable lobbying is imperative to assess the 
effect of auditor lobbying on audit quality.  
For the preceding reasons, we measure auditor lobbying for a client as the percentage of 
overlap of the politicians that the auditor and the client donate to through PAC contributions. 
More specifically, we measure accounting firms’ lobbying for their clients through a variable 
LOBBY_COMP, which is measured as the proportion of overlap in political connections between 
auditors and their audit clients.12 The U.S. congress has 535 members—100 senators and 435 
                                                     
12 An alternative method to measure the firms’ common political strategies is by their partisanship tendency revealed 
through PAC contributions. For example, Cooper et al. (2010) separate the total amounts of the PAC contributions 
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house representatives. The accounting firms in our sample donate to an average of 236 
politicians per election cycle, while the client firms donate to an average of 56 politicians. For 
each client and accounting firm, we sort the politicians they contribute to by the dollar amount of 
PAC contributions and retain their top 25 politicians. The greater the PAC contribution, the more 
important that politician should be to the firm. Thus we only retain the top 25 politicians.13 Next, 
we compare the auditors’ top 25 politicians with that of each one of its clients and determine the 
number of politicians that overlap. Finally, our yearly proxy for lobbying, LOBBY_COMP, is 
computed as the number of politicians that overlap divided by 25. For example, if there are five 
overlapping politicians between the auditor and its client, LOBBY_COMP would be 20%. PAC 
contributions are disclosed on a bi-annual basis, but we compute LOBBY_COMP every year 
based on the firm’s current auditor and most recent PAC information.  
3.3 VALIDATION OF AUDITOR LOBBYING MEASURE  
 
Panel A of Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the lobbying variable. On average, 
there are 20.85 overlapped politicians between the auditors and their clients when counting all 
politicians who receive PAC contributions from our sample firms (i.e., not restricted to the top 
25). When restricted to the top 25 politicians, the average number of overlapped politicians 
between auditors and their clients is 2.23, or a LOBBY_COMP of 8.9%. The highest level of 
alignment is 44%, which indicates 11 common politicians in the top 25.14 Next, we provide 
evidence that our auditor lobbying measure captures both disclosed and undisclosed lobbying. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
made by a firm into Republican and Democratic and define the firm as Republican-leaning or Democratic-leaning. 
One problem with this measure is that the variation in partisanship is too small, as a majority of our sample firms are 
Republican-leaning. 
13 We limit the number of politicians to the top 25 but conduct additional robustness tests with the top 10, 20, and 
50. The results are qualitatively similar. 
14 When two firms each independently donate to top 25 politicians out of 535 congress members, the chance of them 
donating to a same politician would be 
25
535
 x 
25
535
 ≈ 0.0022. Our sample firms’ LOBBY_COMP value being an 
average 8.5% is thus nontrivial.  
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3.3.1. Disclosed lobbying activities 
If our proxy captures disclosed lobbying, we would expect LOBBY_COMP to be 
associated with disclosed lobbying activities. Specifically, we collect information about lobby 
activities for each auditor disclosed under the Lobby Disclosure Act of 1995. We divide the 
sample into two groups based on disclosed lobbying activities: client firms that hire their own 
auditors to lobby and client firms that do not hire their own auditors to lobby. We then compare 
LOBBY_COMP across the two samples based on disclosed lobbying activities in Panel B of 
Table 1. We find that client firms that use their own auditors to lobby have on average (median) 
an overlap of 20.8% (20.0%), while client firms in the control group have on average (median) 
an overlap of 8.7% (4.0%). The difference between the two groups is statistically significant. 
Therefore it appears LOBBY_COMP captures disclosed lobbying activities.15  
We also provide descriptive statistics for several variables that proxy for audit quality by 
firms that employ their own auditor to lobby and those that do not employ their own auditor to 
lobby. We find no significant difference for restatements, AAERs, going concern, discretionary 
accruals, or current discretionary accruals. These results are consistent with our main finding, 
however, since the disclosed lobbying sample is small the test could lack power to detect 
differences.  
3.3.2. Undisclosed lobbying activities 
Next, we examine whether our lobbying proxy captures undisclosed lobbying. Since 
these activities are not disclosed, we cannot directly examine the association. However, even 
though auditor’s clients may not be explicitly charged for lobbying and regulation information 
                                                     
15 To rule out the possibility that all Big 4 auditors have the same political strategies, we also compute the overlap of 
connected politicians among the Big 4 auditors. We compare each auditor’s top 25 politicians with that of the other 
three Big 4 auditors and find the overlap ranges from 54% to 38%.  It is not surprising that accounting firms have a 
high overlap since they are in the same industry and have common political goals. However, they seem to have 
distinct political agendas given the variation in the politicians they contribute to. 
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services, Watts and Zimmerman (1986) state “[p]otential clients probably consider these services 
when choosing an auditor and audit fees reflect these services.” Therefore, to examine whether 
our proxy for lobbying captures undisclosed lobbying, we examine the association between audit 
fees and LOBBY_COMP. If our lobbying measure captures indirect lobbying, based on Watts 
and Zimmerman (1986), we would expect clients to be implicitly charged for these services 
through higher audit fees. We estimate the following model and include industry and year 
indicator variables:  
   log(Total Fees)t or log(Audit Fees)t = β0 + β1LOBBY_COMPt + β2log(PAC)t  
    + β3Big4t + β4Sizet + β5Mergert + β6Financingt  
    + β7Book-to-Markett + β8Leveraget + β9Losst  
    + β10High Litigationt + β11ROAt + β12A/R_Inventoryt  
    + β13Special Itemst + β14Segmentst + β15Auditor Tenuret 
   + β16Foreign Opst + εt             (1) 
log(Total Fees) = natural logarithm of total fees paid to a firm’s auditor. 
log(Audit Fees) = natural logarithm of audit fees paid to a firm’s auditor. 
LOBBY_COMP = proportion of overlap in political connection between the auditor and its 
client, measured as the number of top 25 politicians that receive political 
action committee (PAC) contributions from both the auditor and its client 
divided by 25. 
Log(PAC) = natural logarithm of total PAC contributions. 
Big4 = 1 if the firm is audited by a Big 4 auditor (Deloitte, Ernst & Young, 
KPMG, Arthur Andersen, or PricewaterhouseCoopers), zero otherwise.   
Size = natural logarithm of total assets in millions (Compustat: AT).  
Merger = 1 if the firm has engaged in a merger or acquisition (Compustat: AQC), 
zero otherwise. 
Financing = 1 if MA is not equal to 1 and number of shares outstanding (Compustat: 
SSTK) increased by at least 10%, or long-term debt (Compustat: DLTIS) 
increased by at least 20%, or the firm first appeared on the CRSP 
monthly returns database in year t, zero otherwise.  
Book-to-Market = book value (Compustat: SEQ) divided by market value of equity 
(Compustat: PRCC_F*CSHO).  
Leverage = total debt (Compustat: DLC + DLTT) divided by total assets.   
Loss = 1 if the firm reports income before extraordinary items (Compustat: IB) 
that is less than zero, zero otherwise. 
High Litigation = 1 if the firm operates in a high-litigation industry, zero otherwise (high-
litigation industries are industries with SIC codes of 2833-2836, 3570-
3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, and 7370-7370). 
ROA = return on assets (Compustat: NI/AT). 
A/R_Inventory = sum of receivables and inventories (Compustat: RECT + INVT), divided 
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by total assets. 
Special Items = 1 if the firm reports a special item, zero otherwise (Compustat: SPI). 
Segments = square root of the number of business segments of the firm (Compustat: 
SEG_TYPE database). 
Auditor Change = one if the firm changes auditors, zero otherwise. 
Foreign Ops = 1 if the firm has foreign operations, zero otherwise. 
 
 The model is estimated using ordinary least squares, and the standard errors are corrected 
to control for clustering across firms (Gow et al., 2010; Petersen, 2009). We use several control 
variables found in prior literature to affect audit fees. Size, Market-to-Book, Segments, and 
Foreign Ops are proxies for audit complexity. Consistent with prior research, we would expect 
audit complexity to be positively related to fees (Simunic, 1980; Francis, 1984). We expect total 
audit hours to increase with the complexity of the audit and therefore audit fees. High Litigation, 
ROA, Leverage, A/R_Inventory, Loss, and Special Items proxy for audit risk (Seetharaman et al., 
2002). Merger and Financing capture the demand for additional audit services necessary to 
complete business combinations and obtain additional capital. We control for Big4 since prior 
research has documented that a brand name price premium exists for Big 4 auditors (Francis and 
Simon, 1987; Francis, 1984; Palmrose, 1986; Francis and Stokes, 1986). Francis and Simon 
(1987) find a substantial audit fee discount in the initial year of the audit engagement. Therefore 
we include whether the auditor changed in a particular year (Auditor Change).  
The sample to estimate model (1) consists of 490 firms (3,670 firm-year observations) between 
2000 and 2008. Our sample starts in 2000 because firms were required to disclose audit fees 
starting in 2000. Table 2 presents the results. When fees are measured as total fees, the 
coefficient on LOBBY_COMP is positive and significant (coefficient = 0.625, p-value=0.01), and 
the results are similar for audit fees.16 Overall, our results suggest that, if auditors are implicitly 
                                                     
16 When we exclude lobbying expenditures paid to the auditor from total fees for the 41 firm-years with disclosed 
lobbying under the Lobbying Disclosure Act, and the results are robust.  
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charging clients for undisclosed lobbying activities (Watts and Zimmerman 1986), then our 
measure for lobbying is capturing undisclosed lobbying activities.  
4. Perceived Audit Quality  
4.1. REGRESSION MODEL 
To examine whether investors perceive lobbying between auditors and their clients as a 
threat to auditor independence, we follow prior literature (e.g., Teoh and Wong, 1993; Ghosh 
and Moon, 2005; Chi et al., 2009; Baber et al., 2014) and infer investors’ perception of auditor 
quality using the earnings response coefficient (ERC) estimated from the following equation: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡                = 𝜈0 + 𝜈1𝐸𝑡 + 𝜈2∆𝐸𝑡 + 𝜈3𝐿𝑂𝐵𝐵𝑌_𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑡 +  𝜈4𝐸𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑂𝐵𝐵𝑌_𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑡
+  𝜈5∆𝐸𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑂𝐵𝐵𝑌_𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑡 +  ∑ 𝜈9+2(𝑗−1)𝐸𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑉𝑗𝑡
10
𝑗=1
+  ∑ 𝜈10+2(𝑗−1)∆𝐸𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑉𝑗𝑡
10
𝑗=1
+ ∑ 𝜈29+𝑗𝐶𝑉𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡
10
𝑗=1
                                                                                           (2) 
 
CAR = the cumulative market-adjusted returns for the 15-month period 
ending three months after the fiscal year-end 
E = income before extraordinary items (Compustat: IB) deflated by the 
market value of equity (Compustat: PRCC_F*CSHO) at the beginning 
of the year. 
ΔE = is the difference between current-year income before extraordinary 
items and last year’s income before extraordinary items deflated by 
the market value of equity at the beginning of the year. 
LOBBY_COMP = proportion of overlap in political connection between the auditor and 
its client, measured as the number of top 25 politicians that receive 
political action committee (PAC) contributions from both the auditor 
and its client divided by 25. 
 
CVj = Control Variables, j = 1, 2, . . . . 10 (discussed below): 
Firm Age = number of years that a firm has been publicly traded as of fiscal year-
end based on beginning dates reported in CRSP.   
Big4 = 1 if the firm is audited by a Big 4 auditor (Deloitte, Ernst & Young, 
KPMG, Arthur Andersen, or PricewaterhouseCoopers), zero 
otherwise.   
Growth = market value of equity plus the book value of debt (Compustat: DLC + 
DLTT) divided by the book value of total assets (Compustat: AT).   
Persistence = first-order autocorrelation of split-adjusted income before 
extraordinary items per share (Compustat: EPSPXQ) for the past 16 
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quarters.   
Volatility = volatility measured as the first-order standard deviation of split-
adjusted income before extraordinary items per share (Compustat: 
EPSPXQ) for the past 16 quarters.   
Beta = systematic risk calculated using the past 60 monthly stock returns.  
Size = natural logarithm of total assets in millions (Compustat: AT).  
Leverage = total debt (Compustat: DLC + DLTT) divided by total assets.   
Auditor Tenure = duration of the auditor-client relationship in years starting from 1982. 
Log(PAC) = natural logarithm of total PAC contributions. 
 
The model is estimated using ordinary least squares, and the standard errors are corrected 
to control for clustering across firms and time (Gow et al. 2010; Petersen 2009). Our focus is on 
the sign and magnitude of the sum of the coefficients on E*LOBBY_COMP and ΔE 
*LOBBY_COMP (ν4 + ν5). If the sum of these two coefficients is negative, it would be consistent 
with investors perceiving auditors’ lobbying efforts on behalf of their own clients as impairing 
the auditors’ independence.  
Ghosh and Moon (2005) recommend using the 15-month CAR ending three months after 
the fiscal year-end to mitigate a potential downward bias in the estimated ERC due to prices 
leading earnings (see also Collins and Kothari, 1989).17 Importantly, PAC and lobbying 
disclosures must be filed with the Senate on a semi-annual basis within 45 days of the January 1st 
and June 30th deadlines. We include 10 control variables and their interactions with earnings 
levels (E) and earnings changes (ΔE) based on Ghosh and Moon (2005). In addition, we control 
for firms’ general lobbying activity by including log(PAC) and its interaction with earnings 
levels (E) and earnings changes (ΔE).  
The remaining control variables are from Ghosh and Moon (2005). We control for firm 
age (Firm Age) because older firms are more stable and have less information asymmetry. Big4 
controls for the better reporting quality provided by big auditors. We control for four indicators 
                                                     
17Our results are qualitatively similar if we use the 12-month CAR ending three months after the fiscal year-end. 
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of stock value: growth opportunities (Growth), earnings persistence (Persistence), firm risk 
(Volatility), and systematic market risk (Beta). Firm size (Size) controls for any size effects. 
Leverage (Leverage) controls for firms’ debt constraints. The tenure of the auditor (Auditor 
Tenure) controls for any earnings quality differences associated with the length of the auditor-
client relationship. 
4.2. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
We report descriptive statistics for the variables used to implement model (2) in Panel A 
of Table 3. The mean and median of LOBBY_COMP are 0.089 and 0.040, respectively, which 
approximates an overlap of about two politicians between a client and their auditor’s top 25 
politicians. The mean CAR is 0.020, and the median is 0.000. Our mean and median CAR are 
higher than Ghosh and Moon (2005), likely reflecting that firms with lobbying activities tend to 
be larger (Chen et al. 2013). Consistent with Ghosh and Moon (2005) and Chi et al. (2009), the 
mean E of 0.036 is smaller than the median of 0.050. The mean and median ΔE are similar to 
Ghosh and Moon (2005) at 0.001 and 0.006, respectively. Panel B of Table 3 indicates that both 
LOBBY_COMP and CAR are significantly correlated with many variables highlighting the need 
for multivariate testing. 
The results of estimating model (2) are reported in Table 4. Consistent with the prior 
literature on ERCs, we document that earnings (E and ΔE) are significantly positively associated 
with returns (ν1 + ν2 = 2.433; p-value from F-test = 0.09).
18 Our main interest is in the sum of the 
two coefficients for E*LOBBY_COMP and ΔE *LOBBY_COMP, which indicates whether 
lobbying is associated with the ERC. The sum of the coefficients ν4 and ν5 is -2.200 and is 
statistically significant based on an F-test (p-value = 0.00). This suggests that, as the lobbying 
                                                     
18We note that our coefficient estimates E and ΔE for are within the range of previous research. While they are larger 
in magnitude than the estimates of Ghosh and Moon (2005), they are a lower magnitude than Chi et al. (2009). 
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between auditors and their clients increases, investors place less confidence in clients’ reported 
earnings.   
We briefly discuss the other control variables documented in prior research to affect the 
ERC. Consistent with Ghosh and Moon (2005) and Chi et al. (2009), we conserve space by 
reporting only the sum of the coefficients for the control variables’ interactions with E and ΔE. 
We find the signs of the coefficients for the following variables are consistent with prior 
literature but not statistically significant: Firm Age, Big4, Beta, Leverage, Auditor Tenure, and 
log(PAC). The positive coefficient for FIRMAGE is not consistent with prior literature but is not 
statistically significant. Consistent with prior research, we find Persistence and Size are 
significantly positively associated with the ERC, while Volatility is significantly negatively 
associated with the ERC.  
Overall, our results suggest that perceived audit quality is impaired when auditors act as 
advocates for their audit clients. When investors perceive a potential advocacy threat to auditor 
independence, they discount earnings when evaluating the client firms’ market prices. This result 
partially validates concerns raised by regulators and the public about auditors lobbying on behalf 
of their audit clients.  
4.3 ADDITIONAL SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
An important methodological consideration is that the relations we document between 
political alignment, earnings, and cumulative abnormal returns might result from of an omitted 
determinant of the cross-section of returns that is correlated with political alignment. For 
example, common unobserved political risk factors simultaneously affecting both stock returns 
and lobbying decisions may affect all firms in the same industry. Recent work by Gormley and 
Matsa (2014) provides an econometric approach to control for unobserved heterogeneity that 
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yields consistent estimates for models with multiple, high-dimensional group effects in a 
computationally feasible manner. In our setting, unobserved heterogeneity (such as political risk 
or growth opportunities that depend on political outcomes) is of particular concern across firms 
and industries.  
As such, we implement the iterative techniques suggested by Gormley and Matsa (2014) 
to control for unobserved heterogeneity across firms and industries. In untabulated results, we 
continue to find that the sum of the two coefficients E*LOBBY_COMP and ΔE 
*LOBBY_COMP is negative (-2.519) and statistically significant based on an F-test (p-value = 
0.04). Thus, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity across firms and industries, we continue to 
find a lower earnings response coefficient when the overlap in lobbying between auditors and 
clients is higher. 
5. Actual Audit Quality  
In this section, we examine the relation between auditor lobbying for clients and the 
actual audit quality of these clients. We examine three measures used in the prior literature. Our 
first measure of audit quality is the likelihood that firms restate earnings; the second is the 
auditor’s likelihood of issuing a going-concern opinion for financially distressed clients; and the 
third is the amount of discretionary accruals. Restatements capture a particularly severe form of 
earnings management where financial statements violate generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP), whereas discretionary accruals capture flexibility within GAAP. The 
propensity to issue a going-concern opinion captures the auditor’s ability and willingness to 
accurately assess the firm’s ability to continue as a going-concern. Each measure captures 
different aspects of audit quality.  
5.1. RESTATEMENT 
5.1.1. Regression model 
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 Restatements capture a particularly severe form of earnings management whereby 
financial statements were not presented in accordance with GAAP. Consistent with prior 
literature (e.g., Cao et al. 2012; DeFond et al. 2012), we estimate the following logistic 
regression:  
   Restatet = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1LOBBY_COMPt + 𝛾2log(PAC)t + 𝛾3Sizet + 𝛾4Book-to-Markett + 𝛾5Leveraget 
            + 𝛾6ROAt + 𝛾7Losst + 𝛾8Big4t + 𝛾9Mergert + 𝛾10Financingt + 𝛾11Segmentst  
        + 𝛾12Foreign Opst  + 𝛾13A/R_Inventoryt + 𝛾14Returnt + 𝛾15High Litigationt + εt     (3)              
Restate = 1 if the firm restated its annual financial statements, zero otherwise. 
AAER = 1 if the firm was subject to an SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement 
Release, zero otherwise. 
Foreign Ops = 1 if the firm has foreign operation, zero otherwise. 
Return = stock return over the fiscal year. 
 
The standard errors are corrected to control for clustering across firms and time (Gow et 
al., 2010; Petersen, 2009).19 We exclude 17 restatements that are quarterly, have a positive effect 
on earnings, or have an earnings impact less than $1 million (Defond et al. 2012).20 In addition to 
restatements, we also use firms that have been sanctioned by the SEC for fraud by an AAER as 
an alternative measure of audit quality.21 AAERs are obtained from the Center for Financial 
Reporting and Management. For the AAER sample, we exclude quarterly AAERs and those that 
have a positive effect on earnings.  
We include log(PAC) to control for the relation between PAC contributions and 
propensity to restate. Size controls for any size effects. Book-to-Market controls for growth 
companies, and Leverage controls for firms near debt constraints because these firms may have 
increased incentives to manage earnings. ROA and Loss controls for the effect of performance on 
the likelihood of restating. We include Big4 because prior research has shown that Big 4 auditors 
                                                     
19 As a sensitivity test, we include auditor fixed effects in all our regressions and the results are robust.  
20 Our results are robust to including these 17 restatements. In addition, our results are robust to only including first-
time restatements. 
21 AAERs are likely to only include cases of fraud. However, due to the limited resources of the SEC, only a subset 
of fraud firms will receive AAERs (Hennes et al.  2008). 
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tend to limit earnings management (e.g., Becker et al., 1998; Myers et al., 2003). We include 
indicator variables to control for the effect of mergers and acquisitions (Merger) and financing 
(Financing). We include Segments and Foreign Ops to control for accounting complexity. We 
include A/R_Inventory to control for the flexibility to engage in earnings management. We 
include litigation risk (High Litigation) to control for whether the firm operates in a high-risk 
industry, defined as industries with SIC codes 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, 
and 7370 (LaFond and Roychowdhury, 2008). 
5.1.2. Empirical results 
Panel A of Table 5 reports the summary statistics for the variables used to implement 
model (4). We find that the mean Restate is 12.9%, which is similar to prior literature that 
identifies restatements using Audit Analytics and excludes quarterly restatements and those that 
have a positive effect on the client’s financial statements.22 Mean AAER is 2.1%, which is lower 
than mean Restate given AAERS occur less frequently than earnings restatements. Since we 
limit the sample to politically active firms, not surprisingly, our sample firms are generally large 
(mean Size = 8.156 billion), profitable (mean ROA = 0.037), and have positive stock returns 
(mean Return = 7.7%). Panel B of Table 3 shows the Pearson correlations among the variables. 
The correlation between LOBBY_COMP and Restate is negative and significant. The correlation 
between LOBBY_COMP and AAER is positive but not significant.  
Panel A of Table 5 indicates that the Pearson correlation between LOBBY_COMP and 
RESTATE is negative and significant but is not significant between LOBBY_COMP and AAER. 
These three main variables are correlated with several other variables, however, which suggests 
that multivariate testing is necessary to provide further evidence. 
The regression results are summarized in Table 6. The coefficient on LOBBY_COMP is  
                                                     
22 For example, Paterson and Valencia (2011) find a 17.6% restatement rate, and Cao et al. (2012) limit their sample 
to Fortune 1000 firms and find a restatement rate of 10.0%. 
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-2.859 in the restatement model and -2.760 in the AAER model. In both models, the coefficients 
are negative and statistically significant. This result suggests that LOBBY_COMP is associated 
with a lower propensity of client firms to restate earnings. To mitigate concerns that these results 
are driven by self-selection, we split the sample into two groups based on the quintile rank of 
LOBBY_COMP. Firms in the highest quintile of LOBBY_COMP are propensity score matched to 
firms that are in the nonhighest quintile. Next, to determine the matching variables, we compare 
the differences in control variables (reported in Table 5, Panel A) across the two samples and 
find log(PAC), Size, Book-to-Market, ROA, Leverage, Loss, and Return are statistically different. 
Therefore we calculate propensity scores derived from a probit model, where the dependent 
variable is one if the firm is in the highest quintile of LOBBY_COMP and zero otherwise and the 
independent variables are log(PAC), Size, Book-to-Market, ROA, Leverage, Loss, Return, year, 
and industry. We then choose a match with the closest propensity score without replacement and 
require matches to have propensity scores within 0.10 (Armstrong et al. 2010; Lawrence et al. 
2011). Based on our criteria, we can find a suitable match for 769 firm-years. The results are 
reported in Table 7. The univariate comparisons reveal that the matching variables are not 
significantly different across the two samples. More importantly, both Restate and AAER are 
significantly lower for firm-years in the highest quintile of LOBBY_COMP compared to their 
matched firms. These results confirm the findings in Table 6, which suggest LOBBY_COMP is 
associated with a lower propensity of client firms to restate earnings.  
There are two reasons why auditor lobbying for clients could lower the probability of 
earnings restatement. First, Simunic (1984) suggests auditors’ knowledge gained from providing 
one type of service may spill over to other services of the same clients. Thus lobbying for clients 
could lead to a positive association between auditor lobbying on behalf of clients and audit 
quality. Lobbying requires understanding clients’ regulatory preferences and concerns 
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(information that is often first gathered by the local audit partner), which is likely to lead to a 
better understanding of political motivations for earnings management (e.g., Jones 1991; 
Ramanna and Roychowdhurry 2010). In-depth knowledge of clients’ regulatory environment and 
political motivations may enhance audit quality, thereby creating a positive externality from 
bundling auditing and lobbying for clients.  
Alternatively, the lower probability of earnings restatement may not indicate better audit 
quality. Recent work recognizes that we do not observe all misstatements but only those that 
have been detected (Wang 2013; Srinivasan et al. 2012). When the probability of detection is 
lower for a set of firms, then lower restatement frequency may not indicate higher reporting 
quality. In our setting, there are two reasons why detection risk of misstatements may be lower 
for firms that lobby with their own auditors. The first is that, if auditor independence is impaired 
by lobbying for clients, then auditors are less likely to detect misstatement of prior years, to 
require restatement if detected, or both. The second reason lobbying by auditors may lower 
detection risk of misstatements is that political pressure can reduce the probability of regulatory 
enforcement. Restatements are costly to both auditors and clients. Their joint political clout may 
reduce the probability of enforcement by regulators. Yu and Yu (2011) show that lobbying could 
reduce a firm’s chance of being detected of fraud and deter the time of detection if eventually 
caught. Correia (2012) shows that politically connected firms are less likely to be involved in 
SEC enforcement actions and face lower penalties on average. Chaney et al. (2011) use an 
international dataset and find that firms with political connections have lower reporting quality 
without being penalized. This argument indicates that lobbying may have two effects on earnings 
restatement simultaneously: lower accounting quality and less chance of being caught. 
5.2. GOING-CONCERN OPINIONS 
5.2.1. Regression model 
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We examine the propensity to issue a going-concern opinion. Prior literature interprets an 
auditor with a lower propensity to issue a going concern opinion, ceteris paribus, as having lower 
audit quality. Following prior literature (DeFond et al., 2002; Carey and Simnett, 2006), we 
estimate the following logistic regression for companies experiencing financial distress (negative 
earnings or cash flows): 
   Going Concernt = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1LOBBY_COMPt + 𝛾2log(PAC)t + 𝛾3Big4t + 𝛾4Prob(Bankruptcy)t  
         + 𝛾5Sizet + 𝛾6Returnt + 𝛾7Leveraget + 𝛾8ΔLeveraget + 𝛾9Losst  
         + 𝛾10Firm Aget + 𝛾11Investmentst + 𝛾12Financingt + 𝛾13CFOt  
         + 𝛾14Reporting Lagt + εt                          (4) 
Going Concern = 1 if the firm receives a going-concern audit opinion, zero otherwise. 
Prob(Bankruptcy) = probability of bankruptcy score (Zmijewki, 1984). 
∆Leverage = change in Leverage from t-1 to t. 
Investments = short- and long-term investment securities (including cash and cash 
equivalents) (Compustat: CH + CHE + IST) divided by total assets. 
CFO = cash flow from operating activities (Compustat: OANCF) divided by 
total assets. 
Reporting Lag = number of days between fiscal year-end and the earnings 
announcement date. 
 
Following DeFond et al. (2002), we include several variables that influence whether the 
firm receives a going-concern opinion. We include the Zmijewski score, Prob(Bankruptcy), to 
control for the probability of bankruptcy and Size to control for the greater negotiating power of 
larger firms in the event of financial distress. We include the age of the firm (Firm Age) because 
younger companies are more likely to become financially distressed. Return controls for the 
negative relation between going-concern opinions and returns. Leverage and ∆Leverage control 
for firms’ near debt constraints. We include whether the firm had a loss (Loss) because these 
firms are more likely to fail. Cash flow from operations (CFO) is included because poor 
operating cash flows are associated with bankruptcy. Investments is a liquidity measure that 
controls for firms with more resources to prevent bankruptcy, and Financing controls for firms 
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with new financing and thus a lower probability of bankruptcy. We include Reporting Lag 
because reporting delays are associated with more going-concern opinions. 
5.2.2. Empirical results 
The results are reported in Table 8. The going concern rate is 7.80% (70/898), which is 
consistent with Defond et al. (2002) and Reynolds and Francis (2000). The coefficient on 
LOBBY_COMP is negative and not significantly different from zero. This insignificant 
coefficient on LOBBY_COMP is robust to several sensitivity tests. First, we substitute first-time 
going-concern opinions as the dependent variable. Second, recognizing that not all firms that 
have negative earnings or negative cash flows deserve going-concern opinions, we estimate 
model (4) on the most severely distressed quartile (based on lowest cash flow and earnings). 
Lastly, we propensity score match using the same procedure described to produce the results 
presented in Table 7.  
Using the propensity to issue a going-concern opinion as a proxy for audit quality, we fail 
to find evidence consistent with larger values of LOBBY_COMP posing an advocacy threat to 
auditor independence. The benefit of using this measure of audit quality is that a going-concern 
opinion is arguably the outcome of auditing process over which auditors have the most direct 
input and influence. However, whether firms’ fundamentals warrant a going-concern opinion 
could be related to information or events outside the auditor’s scope, which could introduce 
noise into this audit quality measure. Overall, our analysis fails to find an association between 
auditor lobbying for clients and impaired auditor independence based on the propensity to issue a 
going-concern opinion.  
5.3. PERFORMANCE-MATCHED DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS 
5.3.1. Regression model 
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In this section, we use performance-matched discretionary accruals to proxy for audit 
quality. Restatements capture a particularly severe form of earnings management (i.e., violations 
of GAAP), while discretionary accruals are intended to capture flexibility within GAAP. Larger 
values of LOBBY_COMP may pose an advocacy threat to auditor independence and the lower 
audit quality may manifest itself in auditors allowing greater flexibility within GAAP. To test the 
possibility, we implement the following model (Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Lai and Gul, 2008; 
DeFond et al. 2012):  
   Dis. Accrualst or Dis. Current Accrualst = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1LOBBY_COMPt + 𝛾2log(PAC)t + 𝛾3Sizet  
+ 𝛾4Book-to-Markett + 𝛾5Leveraget + 𝛾6Losst  
+ 𝛾7Big4t + 𝛾8Mergert + 𝛾9Financing + 𝛾10CFOt  
+ 𝛾11Lagged Accrualst + 𝛾12High Litigationt + εt (5) 
 
Dis. Accruals  = discretionary accruals estimated from the modified-Jones model less the 
value of discretionary accruals from a firm matched on performance. 
Dis. Current 
Accruals 
= discretionary current accruals estimated from the modified-Jones model less 
the value of discretionary current accruals from a firm matched on 
performance. 
Accruals = total accruals (Compustat: IBC-OANCF) scaled by beginning of year total 
assets. 
 
Following Kothari et al. (2005), we estimate performance-adjusted discretionary accruals 
(Dis. Accruals) as the residual from the modified-Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995) and subtract 
the residual from a firm in the same year and industry with the closest return on assets. Prior 
research suggests that managers have the most discretion over discretionary current accruals 
(e.g., Becker et al., 1998; Ashbaugh et al., 2003). Thus we also estimate performance-adjusted 
discretionary current accruals (Dis. Accruals) by adding back depreciation to total accruals and 
excluding property, plant, and equipment from the estimation model.  
We include Big4 because prior research has shown that Big 4 auditors tend to limit 
extreme accruals (e.g., Becker et al., 1998; Myers et al., 2003). We include Size because large 
firms have more stable accruals (Dechow and Dichev, 2002). We include indicator variables to 
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control for the effect of mergers and acquisitions (Merger) and financing (Financing). We 
include variables that proxy for the ability and incentives of the firm to engage in accruals 
management: Book-to-Market, Leverage, and Loss. Firms that are near debt constraints and 
raising external financing may have greater incentives to manage earnings (e.g., DeFond and 
Jiambalvo, 1994; Becker et al., 1998). Book-to-Market controls for the difference in 
discretionary accruals between growth and value firms. We include Lagged Accruals to control 
for mean reversion in accruals. 
5.3.2. Empirical results 
The results are summarized in Table 9. The coefficient on LOBBY_COMP is positive but 
insignificant in both equations. Thus we fail to find support for the idea that auditor lobbying for 
clients is associated with impaired auditor independence measured by discretionary accruals. In 
addition, we propensity score match using the same procedure described to produce the results 
presented in Table 7. After propensity score matching, we fail to find significant differences 
between the sample of firms in the highest quintile of LOBBY_COMP and the control firms.  
Larger values of LOBBY_COMP may pose an advocacy threat to auditor independence 
and the lower audit quality may manifest itself with respect to an earnings management incentive 
such as meeting earnings benchmarks but not in overall discretionary accruals. Consistent with 
prior research (e.g., Matsumoto, 2002; Brown and Pinello, 2007), we identify the earnings 
management incentive as accruals that help firms meet or beat analyst forecasts. Our specific 
approach follows Brown and Pinello (2007) in that we identify firms with nonnegative earnings 
surprises and examine whether firms that lobby with their auditors are more likely to have 
positive discretionary accruals that just meet or beat an analyst forecast. We estimate a logistic 
regression:  
   Prob(Positive_Accrualst=1 | NonNegative_Earningst=1) = F(𝛾0 + 𝛾1LOBBY_COMPt  
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   + 𝛾2log(PAC)t + 𝛾3Market Valuet  
   + 𝛾4Book-to-Markett + 𝛾5Losst  
   + 𝛾6|Forecast Error|t + εt)          (6) 
Positive_Accruals  = 1 if discretionary accruals controlling for performance are positive, zero 
otherwise23 
NonNegative 
Earnings 
= nonnegative earnings surprise, which is 1 if actual earnings per share 
(EPS) from IBES is greater than or equal to the last consensus forecast, 
zero otherwise 
Market Value =  natural logarithm of the market value of equity 
|Forecast Error|  = the absolute value of the actual EPS minus the earliest consensus 
forecast (after last year’s earnings announcement), scaled by the fiscal-
year-end price 
 
 A positive coefficient on LOBBY_COMP would be consistent with lobbying posing an 
advocacy threat to auditor independence that leads to lower audit quality. logPAC controls for 
firms’ general political action committee activities, and the rest of the control variables are from 
the model employed by Brown and Pinello (2007). Specifically, Market-to-Book controls for 
greater costs to missing analysts’ forecasts for growth firms (Skinner and Sloan 2002). |Forecast 
Error| proxies for forecasting uncertainty. Market Value proxies for size since analyst forecasts 
are less optimistically biased for larger firms (Hwang et al., 1996; Brown, 1997). Avoiding a 
negative earnings surprise may be less important for loss firms (Degeorge et al.,1999). The 
coefficient on LOBBY_COMP (untabulated) is not significant when implementing model (6). 
Overall, using discretionary accruals as a proxy for audit quality, we fail to find support that 
auditor lobbying is related to audit quality measured by discretionary accruals to achieve an 
earnings benchmark.  
7. Conclusion 
Accounting firms lobby politicians and regulators on their own behalf and on behalf of 
their clients. Lobbying for clients is controversial, as it may pose an advocacy threat to actual 
                                                     
23We obtain qualitatively similar results if we define the dependent variable as one if a firm would have missed the 
consensus analyst forecast without discretionary accruals but meets or beats the consensus forecast with 
discretionary accruals. 
32 
 
and perceived auditor independence. Using a unique measure of accounting firms’ political 
advocacy for clients, we examine whether it is associated with impaired auditor independence 
and lower audit quality. We find perceived audit quality is lower when our measure of political 
advocacy is high, but we fail to find evidence consistent with actual audit quality being lower 
using three different measures of audit quality.  
To our knowledge, our study provides the first systematic examination of the impact of 
one type of advocacy threat presented by auditors lobbying on behalf of their own clients. When 
auditors advocate and promote clients’ interests, they risk losing their objectivity and 
professional skepticism in the eyes of the investors and the public. Although we fail to find 
evidence that this threat to auditor independence materializes in the auditing process, investors 
appear to discount the usefulness of financial information when evaluating these firms’ market 
prices. Our findings partially justify the concerns raised by regulators and the public that 
perceived audit quality is impaired when auditors act as the clients’ advocates. However, it 
seems other incentives and mechanisms, such as reputation and litigation risk, may already 
provide enough discipline to maintain auditor independence. 
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APPENDIX: Definition of Variables  
 
Dependent and test variables: 
LOBBY_COMP = proportion of overlap in political connection between the auditor and its 
client, measured as the number of top 25 politicians that receive political 
action committee (PAC) contributions from both the auditor and its client 
divided by 25. 
AAER = 1 if the firm was subject to an SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement 
Release, zero otherwise. 
Going Concern = 1 if the firm receives a going-concern audit report, zero otherwise. 
log(Total Fees) = natural logarithm of total fees paid to a firm’s auditor. 
log(Audit Fees) = natural logarithm of audit fees paid to a firm’s auditor. 
Dis. Accruals = discretionary accruals estimated from the modified-Jones model less the 
value of discretionary accruals from a firm matched on performance. 
Dis. Current 
Accruals 
= discretionary current accruals estimated from the modified-Jones model less 
the value of discretionary current accruals from a firm matched on 
performance. 
Restate = 1 if the firm restated annual earnings, zero otherwise. 
Control variables: 
A/R_Inventory = sum of receivables and inventories (Compustat: RECT + INVT), divided by 
total assets. 
Audit Change = one if the firm changes auditors, zero otherwise. 
Auditor Tenure = duration of the auditor-client relationship in years starting from 1982. 
Big4 = 1 if the firm is audited by a Big 4 auditor (Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, 
Arthur Andersen or PricewaterhouseCoopers), zero otherwise.   
Beta = systematic risk calculated using the past 60 monthly stock returns.   
Book-to-Market = book value (Compustat: SEQ) divided by market value of equity 
(Compustat: PRCC_F*CSHO).  
CAR = cumulative market-adjusted returns for the 15-month period ending three 
months after the fiscal year-end.   
CFO = cash flow from operating activities (Compustat: OANCF) divided by total 
assets. 
   
E = income before extraordinary items (Compustat: IB) deflated by the market 
value of equity (Compustat: PRCC_F*CSHO) at the beginning of the year.   
|Forecast Error| = the absolute value of the actual EPS minus the earliest consensus forecast 
(after last year’s earnings announcement), scaled by the fiscal-year-end 
price. 
Financing = 1 if MA is not equal to 1 and number of shares outstanding (Compustat: 
SSTK) increased by at least 10%, or long-term debt (Compustat: DLTIS) 
increased by at least 20%, or the firm first appeared on the CRSP monthly 
returns database in year t, zero otherwise.  
Firm Age = number of years that a firm has been publicly traded as of fiscal year-end 
based on beginning dates reported in CRSP.   
Foreign Ops = 1 if the firm has foreign operations, zero otherwise. 
Growth = market value of equity plus the book value of debt (Compustat: DLC + 
DLTT) divided by the book value of total assets (Compustat: AT).   
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High Litigation  = 1 if the firm operates in a high-litigation industry, zero otherwise (high-
litigation industries are industries with SIC codes of 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 
3600-3674, 5200-5961, and 7370-7370). 
Investments = short- and long-term investment securities (including cash and cash 
equivalents) (Compustat: CH + CHE + IST) divided by total assets. 
Lagged Accruals = last year’s total accruals (Compustat: IBC-OANCF) scaled by beginning-of-
year total assets.  
Leverage = total debt (Compustat: DLC + DLTT) divided by total assets.   
log(PAC) = natural logarithm of total PAC contributions. 
Loss = 1 if the firm reports income before extraordinary items (Compustat: IB) that 
is less than zero, zero otherwise. 
Market Value = natural logarithm of the market value of equity. 
Merger = 1 if the firm has engaged in a merger or acquisition (Compustat: AQC), zero 
otherwise. 
NonNegative 
Earnings 
= nonnegative earnings surprise, which is 1 if actual earnings per share (EPS) 
from IBES is greater than or equal to the last consensus forecast, zero 
otherwise. 
Persistence = first-order autocorrelation of split-adjusted income before extraordinary 
items per share (Compustat: EPSPXQ) for the past 16 quarters.   
Positive_Accruals = 1 if discretionary accruals controlling for performance are positive, zero 
otherwise. 
Prob(Bankruptcy) = probability of bankruptcy score (Zmijewki, 1984). 
Return = stock return over the fiscal year. 
ROA = return on assets (Compustat: NI/AT). 
Reporting Lag = number of days between fiscal year-end and the earnings announcement 
date. 
Segments = square root of the number of business segments of the firm (Compustat: 
SEG_TYPE database). 
Size = natural logarithm of total assets in millions (Compustat: AT).  
Special Items = 1 if the firm reports a special item, zero otherwise (Compustat: SPI) 
Volatility = first-order standard deviation of split-adjusted income before extraordinary 
items per share (Compustat: EPSPXQ) for the past 16 quarters.   
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Figure 1: Summary of an Accounting Firm’s Political Activities  
 
General 
category 
Level Example of a 
regulator being 
lobbied 
Method Disclosure requirement 
Direct 
lobbying 
Federal level Congress 
member 
Meeting, gathering 
information, etc. 
Disclosed and regulated per the Lobbying 
Disclosure Act  
Local level  State/municipal 
level regulator 
Meeting, gathering 
information, etc. 
Depends on local disclosure requirements 
Industry level  FASB member Meeting, gathering 
information, writing 
comment letters, etc. 
Undisclosed, although comment letters 
are publicly available 
Political 
contribution 
 
Federal level  Congress 
member 
PAC donation  Disclosed and regulated per the Federal 
Election Campaign Act 
Local level  State/municipal 
level regulator 
PAC donation Depends on local disclosure requirement 
Industry level  FASB member* NA NA 
 
* FASB members are appointed by the Financial Accounting Foundation for a five-year term, and there is not an election campaign.  
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Table 1
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for political alignment between auditor and client (1998-2008)
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Raw # of politicians that overlap (no amount restriction) 20.85 8.00 34.65 0.00 279.00
Raw # of politicians that overlap (top 25) 2.23 1.00 2.44 0.00 11.00
LOBBY_COMP (top 25 overlap / 25) 8.9% 4.0% 9.7% 0.0% 44.0%
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for auditor lobbying by whether firms employ their own auditor to lobby
Mean Median Mean Median
LOBBY_COMP 20.8%*** 20.0%*** 8.7% 4.0%
Restate 0.07 0.00 0.13 0.00
AAER 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00
Going Concern 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00
Dis. Accruals -0.07 0.00 -0.14 -0.03
Dis. Current Accruals -0.02 -0.10 -0.21 -0.04
Validation of Auditor Lobbying Proxy
Firms that employ their own 
auditor to lobby (n=41)
Firms that do not emloy their 
own auditor to lobby 
(n=4,827)
The sample consists of 4,868 firm-years with PAC expenditures between 1998 to 2008. */**/*** represent statistical significance at 
10%/5%/1% levels two-tailed between the sample of firms that employ their own auditor to lobby and those that do not employ their 
own auditor to lobby. LOBBY_COMP is the proportion of overlap in political connection between the auditor and its client, measured as 
the number of top 25 politicians that receive political action committee (PAC) contributions from both the auditor and its client divided by 
25.  See Appendix A for variable definitions.
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Table 2
log(Total Fees) log(Audit Fees)
Constant 8.980*** (0.00) 8.942*** (0.00)
LOBBY_COMP 0.625** (0.01) 0.635*** (0.00)
log(PAC) -0.012** (0.03) -0.012** (0.02)
Big4 0.242** (0.04) 0.273** (0.03)
Size 0.527*** (0.00) 0.498*** (0.00)
Merger 0.116*** (0.00) 0.086** (0.02)
Financing -0.021 (0.56) -0.037 (0.30)
Book-to-Market -0.003 (0.76) 0.003 (0.70)
Leverage 0.525*** (0.00) 0.657*** (0.00)
Loss 0.155*** (0.00) 0.131*** (0.00)
High Litigation 0.038 (0.55) 0.011 (0.84)
ROA -0.041 (0.83) -0.076 (0.70)
A/R_Inventory 0.475*** (0.00) 0.514*** (0.00)
Special Items -0.005 (0.89) 0.016 (0.64)
Segments 0.371*** (0.00) 0.367*** (0.00)
Auditor Change -0.299*** (0.00) -0.255*** (0.00)
Foreign Ops 0.242*** (0.00) 0.254*** (0.00)
No. of Observations 3,670 3,670
No. of Firms (clusters) 490 490
Adj. R2 0.758 0.794
Regression of total and audit fees on comprehensive lobbying and controls
log(Fees) = β 0  + β 1 *LOBBY_COMP + X *Control Variables
The sample consists of 3,670 firm-year (490 firms) with PAC expenditures between 
2000 to 2008. */**/*** represent statistical significance at 10%/5%/1% levels two-
tailed.  p-values are in parentheses.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% 
and 99% level. See Appendix A for variable definitions.
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Table 3
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. 25% 75%
LOBBY_COMP 0.089 0.040 0.097 0.000 0.160
CAR 0.020 0.000 0.364 -0.219 0.247
E 0.036 0.050 0.082 0.023 0.070
ΔE 0.001 0.006 0.082 -0.014 0.021
Firm Age 31.234 27.000 22.823 12.000 43.000
Big4 0.978 1.000 0.147 1.000 1.000
Growth 1.621 1.193 1.331 0.859 1.870
Persistence 0.254 0.217 0.373 -0.016 0.513
Volatility 0.370 0.222 0.455 0.116 0.436
Beta 0.956 0.868 0.638 0.527 1.246
Size 8.205 8.245 1.820 6.926 9.586
Leverage 0.273 0.258 0.178 0.143 0.381
Auditor Tenure 2.269 2.485 0.843 1.792 2.944
log(PAC) 6.839 6.909 0.638 6.217 6.909
Panel A: Summary Statistics
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Table 3 (continued)
LOBBY_
COMP CAR E ΔE
Firm 
Age Big4 Growth Persistence Volatility Beta Size Leverage
Auditor 
Tenure
CAR 0.04**
E 0.08*** 0.26***
ΔE 0.00*** 0.20*** 0.51***
Firm Age 0.21*** 0.03* 0.13*** 0.01
Big4 0.14*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.01 0.05***
Growth 0.09*** 0.18*** 0.02 0.06*** -0.06*** 0.01
Persistence 0.00 0.03* 0.01 -0.03* 0.00* 0.02 0.07***
Volatility 0.00 -0.10*** -0.29*** -0.03* 0.05* 0.04** -0.22*** -0.10***
Beta -0.12*** -0.14*** -0.21*** -0.02 -0.15 0.04** 0.02 0.07*** 0.20***
Size 0.44*** 0.17**** 0.22*** 0.09*** 0.31*** 0.23*** 0.39*** 0.03** -0.05** -0.06***
Leverage -0.04** -0.09*** -0.12*** -0.02 -0.03 0.05*** -0.19*** -0.11*** 0.16*** -0.04** -0.11***
Auditor Tenure 0.13*** 0.03** 0.05** -0.01 0.23 0.16*** 0.00 0.02 -0.02 -0.07*** 0.15*** -0.05***
log(PAC) 0.10*** 0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.05*** 0.06*** -0.02 -0.01 0.15*** 0.01 -0.01
Panel B: Pearson correlation matrix 
The sample consists of 3,557 firm-years with PAC expenditures between 1998 to 2008. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. All variables are 
measured at the end of fiscal year t unless noted otherwise.  */**/*** represent statistical significance at 10%/5%/1% levels two-tailed. See Appendix A for variable 
definitions.  
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Table 4
Coef. CAR p-value
Constant (ν 0 ) -0.232** (0.03)
E (ν 1 ) 3.030** (0.02)
ΔE (ν 2 ) -0.597 (0.61)
(ν 1  + ν 2 ) 2.433* (0.09)
LOBBY_COMP (ν 3 ) -0.152 (0.11)
E*LOBBY_COMP (ν 4 ) 0.335 (0.70)
ΔE*LOBBY_COMP (ν 5 ) -2.535*** (0.00)
(ν 4  + ν 5 ) -2.200*** (0.00)
Controls:
E*Firm Age (ν 6 ) / ΔE*Firm Age (ν 7 ) (ν 6  + ν 7 ) 0.005 (0.21)
E*Big 4 (ν 8 ) / ΔE*Big 4 (ν 9 ) (ν 8  + ν 9 ) -0.626 (0.17)
E*Growth (ν 10 ) / ΔE*Growth (ν 11 ) (ν 10  + ν 11 ) 0.259 (0.15)
E*Persistence (ν 12 ) / ΔE*Persistence (ν 13 ) (ν 12  + ν 13 ) 0.634*** (0.01)
E*Volatility (ν 14 ) / ΔE*Volatility (ν 15 ) (ν 14  + ν 15 ) -0.687*** (0.00)
E*Beta (ν 16 ) / ΔE*Beta (ν 17 ) (ν 16  + ν 17 ) -0.054 (0.77)
E*Size (ν 18 ) / ΔE*Size (ν 19 ) (ν 18  + ν 19 ) 0.207*** (0.00)
E*Leverage (ν 20 ) / ΔE*Leverage (ν 21 ) (ν 20  + ν 21 ) -0.101 (0.89)
E*Auditor Tenure (ν 22 ) / ΔE*Auditor Tenure (ν 23 ) (ν 22  + ν 23 ) -0.198 (0.17)
E*log(PAC) (ν 24 ) / ΔE*log(PAC) (ν 25 ) (ν 24  + ν 25 ) -0.196 (0.44)
Firm Age (ν 26 ) 0.000 (0.51)
Big4 (ν 27 ) 0.083** (0.05)
Growth (ν 28 ) 0.042*** (0.00)
Persistence (ν 29 ) -0.030 (0.17)
Volatility (ν 30 ) 0.014 (0.44)
Beta (ν 31 ) -0.058 (0.14)
Size (ν 32 ) 0.008 (0.54)
Leverage (ν 32 ) -0.076 (0.13)
Auditor Tenure (ν 33 ) 0.014* (0.09)
log(PAC) (ν 34 ) 0.007 (0.51)
No. of Observations 3,557
R2 0.151
The sample consists of 3,557 firm-year observations with PAC expenditures between 1998 and 2008. All variables are measured at 
the end of fiscal year t unless noted otherwise.  */**/*** represent statistical significance at 10%/5%/1% levels two-tailed.  p-values 
are in parentheses.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. See Appendix A for variable definitions.
CAR = υ 0  + υ 1 *E + υ 2 *ΔE + υ 3 *LOBBY_COMP +  υ 4 *E*LOBBY_COMP + υ 5 *ΔE*LOBBY_COMP +  X*E*Control 
Variables + X*ΔE*Control Variables + X*Control Variables
Earnings response coefficients and investor perceptions of comprehensive lobbying
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Table 5
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. 25% 75%
LOBBY_COMP 0.085 0.040 0.096 0.000 0.160
Restate 0.129 0.000 0.336 0.000 0.000
AAER 0.021 0.000 0.144 0.000 0.000
Going Concern 0.021 0.000 0.143 0.000 0.000
Dis. Accruals -0.117 -0.026 7.344 -1.073 0.874
Dis. Current Accruals -0.184 -0.035 4.625 -0.792 0.437
log(PAC) 9.145 10.434 4.006 8.700 11.623
Size 8.156 8.216 1.730 7.022 9.444
Book-to-Market 0.059 0.380 3.426 0.210 0.631
Leverage 0.637 0.620 0.247 0.488 0.761
ROA 0.037 0.048 0.124 0.009 0.093
Loss 0.204 0.000 0.403 0.000 0.000
Big4 0.966 1.000 0.182 1.000 1.000
Merger 0.486 0.000 0.500 0.000 1.000
Finance 0.236 0.000 0.424 0.000 0.000
Segments 2.251 2.236 0.696 1.732 2.646
Foreign Ops. 0.453 0.000 0.498 0.000 1.000
A/R_Inventory 0.272 0.241 0.183 0.131 0.372
Return 0.077 -0.005 0.618 -0.261 0.259
High Litigation 0.207 0.000 0.405 0.000 0.000
Panel A: Summary Statistics
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Table 5 (continued)
LOBBY_ 
COMP Restate AAER
Going 
Concern
Dis. 
Accruals
Dis. 
Current 
Accruals log(PAC) Size
Book-to-
Market Leverage ROA Loss Big4 Merger Finance Segments
Foreign 
Ops.
A/R_Inve
ntory Return
Restate -0.03**
AAER 0.01 0.26***
Going Concern -0.07*** -0.02 -0.02
Dis. Accruals 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.02
Dis. Current Accruals 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.65***
log(PAC) 0.54*** 0.02* 0.04*** -0.06*** 0.02 0.02
Size 0.46*** 0.03** 0.11*** -0.06*** -0.02 0.02 0.44***
Book-to-Market 0.02 0.03* 0.02 -0.64*** 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00
Leverage -0.03** 0.03** 0.04*** 0.39*** 0.04*** 0.01 0.06*** 0.08*** -0.44***
ROA 0.14*** -0.04*** -0.01 -0.29*** -0.02 -0.02 0.13*** 0.19*** 0.24*** -0.31***
Loss -0.15*** 0.06*** 0.02* 0.27*** 0.02 0.03* -0.12*** -0.16*** -0.21*** 0.27*** -0.65***
Big4 0.16*** 0.04*** 0.03* 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.13*** 0.22*** -0.02 0.00 0.05*** -0.07***
Merger 0.08*** 0.01 0.04*** -0.10*** -0.03** -0.02 0.10*** 0.16*** 0.10*** -0.08*** 0.11*** -0.14*** 0.10***
Finance -0.02 0.03* 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.03** 0.00 0.02 -0.04*** 0.06*** 0.01 -0.54***
Segments 0.14*** 0.04*** 0.05*** -0.04*** -0.01 -0.02 0.21*** 0.42*** 0.00 0.00 0.11*** -0.06*** 0.05*** 0.17*** -0.08***
Foreign Ops. 0.18*** -0.02* 0.03** -0.08*** -0.02 -0.02* 0.15*** 0.30*** 0.04*** -0.09*** 0.20*** -0.20*** 0.12*** 0.16*** -0.05*** 0.41***
A/R_Inventory -0.08*** -0.01 0.05*** -0.03** 0.01 0.01 -0.10*** -0.17*** 0.06*** -0.04*** 0.17*** -0.17*** -0.02* 0.12*** -0.06*** 0.08*** 0.11***
Return -0.05*** 0.00 -0.03** -0.01 0.00 -0.03* -0.05*** -0.09*** 0.07*** -0.02 0.12*** -0.10*** 0.01 -0.06*** 0.11*** -0.04*** -0.02 0.04***
High Litigation 0.16*** 0.02 -0.01 -0.05*** -0.01 0.03** 0.03** 0.14*** 0.01 -0.16*** 0.09*** -0.06*** 0.07*** 0.00 0.00 -0.10*** 0.05*** 0.03* -0.01
Panel B: Pearson correlation matrix 
The sample consists of 4,868 firm-years with PAC expenditures between 1998 to 2008. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. All variables are measured at the end of fiscal year t unless noted otherwise.  */**/*** 
represent statistical significance at 10%/5%/1% levels two-tailed. See Appendix A for variable definitions.  
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Table 6
Restate AAER
Constant -3.633*** (0.00) -22.717*** (0.00)
LOBBY_COMP -2.859*** (0.00) -2.760* (0.08)
log(PAC) 0.026 (0.22) 0.015 (0.75)
Size 0.049 (0.42) 0.605*** (0.00)
Book-to-Market 0.064** (0.03) 0.226 (0.17)
Leverage 0.546 (0.11) 0.917 (0.40)
ROA -0.337 (0.58) -0.666 (0.72)
Loss 0.433** (0.01) 0.714** (0.03)
Big4 0.340 (0.44) 12.616*** (0.00)
Merger 0.095 (0.53) 0.414 (0.34)
Finance 0.176 (0.19) 0.398 (0.36)
Segments 0.176 (0.18) -0.340 (0.18)
Foreign Ops. -0.155 (0.33) 0.199 (0.59)
A/R_Inventory 0.116 (0.81) 2.367*** (0.00)
Return 0.037 (0.53) -0.206 (0.32)
High Litigation 0.395* (0.07) -0.237 (0.64)
No. of Observations 4,868 4,868
No. of RESTATE or AAER 640 109
Pseudo R2 0.025 0.115
Restate = γ 0 + γ 1 *LOBBY_COMP + X *Control Variables
Logistic regression of restatement on comprehensive lobbying and controls
The sample consists of 4,868 firm-years with PAC expenditures between 1998 to 2008. */**/*** 
represent statistical significance at 10%/5%/1% levels two-tailed.  p-values are in parentheses. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. See Appendix A for variable 
definitions.
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Variable Mean Mean
Restate 0.04* 0.06
AAER 0.02*** 0.04
log(PAC) 11.87 11.92
Size 9.37 9.44
Book-to-Market 0.23 0.19
ROA 0.06 0.06
Leverage 0.62 0.62
Loss 0.10 0.11
Return 0.03 0.02
Firms in the highest quintile of 
LOBBY_COMP  (n=769)
Firms in the nonhighest quintile of 
LOBBY_COMP  (n=769)
Table 7
Univariate statistics based on propensity score matching firms in the highest quintile of 
LOBBY_COMP  and nonhighest quintile of LOBBY_COMP
The sample consists of 1,538 firm-years with PAC expenditures between 1998 to 2008. The sample 
is split into two groups based on LOBBY_COMP . Those firms in the highest quintile of 
LOBBY_COMP are propensity score matched to firms in the nonhighest quntile of LOBBY_COMP 
based on log(PAC), Size, Book-to-Market, ROA, Leverage, Loss, and Return. */**/*** 
represent statistical significance at 10%/5%/1% levels two-tailed.  p-values are in parentheses.  All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. See Appendix A for variable 
definitions.
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Table 8
Going Concern
Constant -11.23*** (0.00)
LOBBY_COMP -4.73 (0.19)
log(PAC) 0.06 (0.29)
Lagged Going Concern 2.49*** (0.00)
Big4 2.61** (0.02)
Prob(Bankruptcy) -0.10** (0.05)
Size -0.11 (0.39)
Return -0.41** (0.02)
Leverage 5.51*** (0.00)
∆Leverage -0.49 (0.45)
Loss 0.29 (0.48)
Firm Age 0.02 (0.34)
Investments 0.91 (0.54)
Financing -0.33 (0.36)
CFO -4.92 (0.36)
Reporting Lag 0.00** (0.02)
No. of Observations 898
No. of Going Concerns 70
Pseudo R2 0.517
Logistic regression of going concern on comprehensive lobbying 
and controls
Going Concern = γ 0 + γ 1 *LOBBY_COMP + X *Control 
Variables
The sample consists of 898 financially distressed firm-years with PAC 
expenditures between 1998 to 2008. Financially distressed companies 
are defined as companies with negative earnings or negative cash flows 
in year t. All variables are measured at the end of fiscal year t unless 
noted otherwise. */**/*** represent statistical significance at 
10%/5%/1% levels two-tailed.  p-values are in parentheses.  All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. See 
Appendix A for variable definitions.
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Table 9
Dis. Accruals Dis. Current Accruals
Constant 0.246 (0.86) 0.035 (0.96)
LOBBY_COMP 0.921 (0.52) -0.523 (0.59)
log(PAC) 0.058* (0.10) 0.026 (0.26)
Size -0.170** (0.04) 0.040 (0.44)
Book-to-Market 0.053 (0.30) -0.004 (0.87)
Leverage 1.236* (0.05) -0.024 (0.95)
Loss -0.102 (0.75) 0.069 (0.74)
Big4 -0.255 (0.81) -0.612 (0.27)
Merger -0.357 (0.17) -0.114 (0.50)
Financing 0.061* (0.84) 0.181 (0.37)
CFO -0.997 (0.59) -1.906* (0.10)
Lagged Accruals -2.024 (0.30) 0.938 (0.38)
High Litigation 0.109 (0.71) 0.412** (0.01)
No. of Observations 4,868 4,868
Adj. R2 0.023 0.018
Dis. Accruals = γ 0 + γ 1 *LOBBY_COMP + X *Control Variables
Regression of signed performance adjusted discretionray accruals and discretionary 
current accruals on comprehensive lobbying and controls
The sample consists of 4,868 firm-years with PAC expenditures between 1998 to 2008. 
*/**/*** represent statistical significance at 10%/5%/1% levels two-tailed.  p-values are in 
parentheses.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. See Appendix A 
for variable definitions.
